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We develop an economic partial equilibrium model for energy supply and demand with 
capital and labor as production factors, and endogenous technological change through   
learning by research and learning by doing. Our model reproduces the learning curve typical 
for (bottom-up) energy system models. The model also produces an endogenous S-curved 
transition from fossil fuel energy sources to carbon-free energy sources over the coming two 
centuries. We use the model to study changes in fossil fuel and carbon-free energy use and 
carbon dioxide emissions induced by carbon taxes. It is shown that induced technological 
change accelerates the substitution of carbon-free energy for fossil fuels substantially, and can 
increase by factor 5 the cumulative emission reductions achieved through a carbon tax over 
the period 2000-2100. 
 
 




JEL: H23, O31, O41, Q42, Q43 
 
 
The research has been funded by the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO) under 
contract nr. 016.005.040, and by the EU under contract number ENG2-CT2001-00538. The 
authors thank the participants of the workshop on Sustainable Technologies for the 21st 
Century, Delmenhorst, Germany, December 12-14, 2002, and the participants of the annual 




Address for correspondence: 
 
Reyer Gerlagh 
Institute for Environmental Studies 
Faculty of Earth and Life Sciences 
Vrije Universiteit 
De Boelelaan 1087 







Induced technological change under carbon taxes
1.  Introduction
Environmental taxes and regulation reduce pollution by shifting behavior away from polluting
activities, but they also encourage the development of new technologies that make pollution
control less costly in the long run (Newel et al. 1999; Popp 2002). Understanding of the response
of technology to economic incentives – dubbed induced innovation or induced technological
change (ITC) – will prove crucial for designing appropriate environmental policies (Jaffe et al.
2002). In the literature, the subject of ITC has been studied mostly in the context of one
representative aggregate production technology (e.g. Verdier 1995, Beltratti 1997, Newell et al.
1999, Goulder and Matthai 2000, Nordhaus 2002). In that context, technology is treated as a
production factor, and ITC stands for a substitution of the factor technology for other production
factors. This paper extends the literature as it addresses ITC in the context of two competing
technologies (energy sources).
Induced technological change is receiving considerable attention in the climate change related
literature where the potential contribution of ITC to policies aiming at greenhouse gas emission
reductions is subject of a yet undecided debate. Various studies try to estimate the impact of ITC
relative to the factor substitution effects without technological change through scenario analyses
(Carraro and Galeotti 1997, Grübler and Messner 1998, Goulder and Schneider 1999, Nordhaus
2002, van der Zwaan et al. 2002, Buonanno et al. 2003, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan 2003). But
the estimated contribution of ITC varies considerably between the studies. Carraro and Galeotti
(1997) employ an econometric model for the EU and come to an optimistic conclusion. ITC can
bring about a double dividend when proper R&D incentives will reduce emissions without the
need for decreasing consumption. Grübler and Messner (1998) use an energy-system model and
conclude that ITC substantially decrease costs and warrant early emission reduction efforts.
Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Nordhaus (2002) are more pessimistic and conclude that,
though ITC is not negligible, its contribution to greenhouse gas emission abatement is small when
compared to the contribution of factor substitution for given technology. The somewhat
disappointing result of these two studies may, however, be explained by the set up of the analyses.
Nordhaus’(2002) study is based on one representative technology, and assumes that the reduction
of carbon dioxide emissions requires the substitution of knowledge for energy. It abstracts from
changes in energy composition, that is, the substitution of carbon-poor energy sources for carbon-
rich energy sources. The substitution between energy sources is included in the other study by
Goulder and Schneider (1999), who consider fossil fuels versus renewable energy sources. These
two energy sources are, however, treated as complements (elasticity of substitution below unity),3
so that substitution and competition is limited. Such an approach may be quite realistic in the
short run, as global energy demand is ever increasing and renewables are, not yet, substitutes.
They may become so in the long run, which is the focus of our analysis.
ITC is a more prominent factor in a context with multiple competing energy sources (van der
Zwaan et al. 2002, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan 2003) and such a context would also be in line
with many so-called Integrated Assessment Models that pay more attention to the energy system
(e.g. Peck and Teisberg 1992; Manne et al. 1995). To constrain climate change, the substitution
between various energy sources is essential. In the long term, energy savings will be insufficient
to reach substantial abatement levels of carbon dioxide emissions, since energy is an essential
production factor. Instead, if a substantial emission abatement strategy is aimed for, a shift away
from fossil fuel based energy sources towards carbon-free energy sources is unavoidable
(Chakravorty et al. 1997, Caldeira et al. 2003). For this reason, in studying the added value of
ITC, we have to take into account the effect of ITC on the relative contribution of various
competing technologies used for energy production (Weyant and Olavson 1999).
1
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, our methodological objective is to bridge the gap
between an energy-system (bottom-up) and an economic (top-down) approach. Second, we carry
out policy analyses to verify the role of ITC in climate change policy, relative to factor
substitution. To study these questions, we develop a partial energy model, DEMETER-2E;
2 the
first DEMETER model has been described and used in van der Zwaan et al (2002) and Gerlagh
and van der Zwaan (2003). The model has the following features. Total energy demand follows an
exogenous path. There are two energy sources (fossil fuels and carbon-free) that compete for their
market shares. The model describes two channels for technological innovations, through research
and development (R&D) and through learning by doing. The level of R&D is driven by economic
incentives, that is, by the value of an innovation to the innovator in the tradition of the
endogenous growth models with natural resources that have been specified to study growth and
sustainability (Gradus and Smulders 1993; Bovenberg and Smulders 1995; den Butter and Hofkes
1995; Verdier 1995; Bovenberg and Smulders 1996; Beltratti 1997; Smulders 1999, Smulders and
                                                  
1 More in general, a representative aggregate technology does not perform well when there are increasing returns
to scale at the disaggregate level, e.g. because of endogenous technological change (Basu and Fernald 1997).
2 DEMETER is an acronym for DE-carbonization Model with Endogenous Technologies for Emission
Reduction. For this paper, we apply a part of version 2, in which only the Energy sector is considered
(DEMETER-2E). As DEMETER-2E only describes the energy sector, it is limited when compared with
DEMETER-1, but on the other hand it extends DEMETER-1 by including learning by research and
distinguishing between private and public innovations. In the future, we intend to extend DEMETER-2E with the
production of non-energy consumer goods as well. The GAMS source code of the model used for this paper is
available at the web-site of the first author: www.vu.nl/ivm/organisation/staff/reyer_gerlagh.html.4
de Nooij 2003). Learning by doing requires no additional effort. It is a direct spill-over effect of
production.
For this model, we calculate ex-post the learning curves for both energy sources, and compare
their characteristics, such as the learning rates, with those found in the energy system literature.
We also compare the transition simulated from fossil fuels to carbon-free energy sources with
generic transition features described in the energy-system literature. We bridge the gap between
bottom-up and top-down models when both learning curves and transition dynamics simulated by
our model satisfy the features described in the energy-system literature.
In carrying out policy analyses, we study the response of CO2 emissions on a carbon tax,
when taking account of technological change and contrast the results with a scenario that assumes
an exogenously developing technological state that that is independent of emission policies. We
assess changes in the results if we include induced technological change (ITC), following
emission policies. To measure the significance of ITC for the responsiveness of cumulative
emissions to constant carbon dioxide taxes, we take the reduction in cumulative carbon dioxide
emissions over the period 2000-2100 following a constant carbon tax of 25 $/tC. We compare the
reduction in cumulative emissions without ITC, and with ITC. The ratio between the two is a
good measure for the relative impact and significance of ITC. This number is important since
most analyses with applied general equilibrium models – that often are at the basis of abatement
costs estimates – assume given technology, and their estimates may be realistic when the ITC
impact factor is minor, but it may be too pessimistic when the ITC impact factor is large.
When carrying out numerical scenario analyses, caution is warranted. We are aware of the
limitations of the modeling approach we follow, which is an abstraction of reality. Producers are
assumed to maximize profits and we neglect taxes and other market distortions. Still we think our
analysis can provide valuable qualitative insights on technological innovation as induced by
carbon taxes, and on the differences and similarities between the economic market equilibrium
approach and the energy-system approach. We attempt to reduce the sensitivity of our results with
respect to specific model features as we calibrate the model such that it generates a benchmark
scenario that is in line with other studies.
Section 2 describes the basic features of the model for each energy source. Section 3 extends
the model so that it describes two competing energy sources, one fossil fuel, the other carbon-free.
There, we also describe the assumptions that link population growth to energy demand, and
energy production to carbon emissions and to changes in the global average temperature. Section
4 describes the calibration of the model. Section 5 provides the results of the simulations. The
final section discusses the implications of our analysis for climate change policies. Two
Appendices are added to the paper. Appendix 1 presents the full list of model equations, including
the first order conditions for the energy producers and innovators. The numerical parameter
values, as found in the calibration procedure, are presented in Appendix 2.5
2.  Energy production under endogenous technology
This section presents the basic elements of our model for energy production and innovation, for
one energy source. Figure 1 presents an overview of the model. We model energy as a produced
good, as depicted in the central column of the figure, using capital and labor as production factors.
Overall productivity of capital and labor depends on knowledge gained through experience, so-
called learning by doing labeled with symbol b, pictured through the lower feed-back loop on the
right, and knowledge produced through research carried out by innovators, depicted at the left side
of the figure and labeled with symbol a. We distinguish a privately owned research-based
knowledge stock – for its use producers have to pay a license fee – from a freely available public
knowledge stock. Both private and public research-based technology stocks are described as an
expanding library of ideas that can be used in the production process. Innovation is a cumulative
process; each innovation builds on the stock of existing knowledge. Energy producers can make
use of all past and present innovations, that is the total stock of knowledge, and pay a license fee
to all innovators that have developed and own the innovations that are currently in use. In turn, the
innovators receive the license fees from all present and future energy producers that use their
innovations. Both innovators and producers of final goods take prices as given. We do not
consider product variety and price setting under monopolistic competition as in many other
endogenous-growth models (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 for an overview). For fossil fuels,
we assume that current production exhausts the resource and this, in turn, decreases future factor
productivity, pictured through the second feed-back loop on the right side of the figure. Stated in
other words, through resource exhaustion, current production increases the future effort required



































FIGURE 1. Schematic overview of innovation and energy production in the model. The innovation
and energy production processes are presented in an ellipse. Stocks are presented in rectangles.
Commodity flows are presented in diamonds.6
Our model assumes a continuum of infinitely small firms, indexed j, that produce energy
according to






where ς is an overall productivity parameter, zt is the cumulative energy production, which, for
fossil fuels, we consider an inverse measure of resource exhaustion. For fossil fuels, the value of
(zt)
µ reflects the effort required to exploit, say, oil wells. The variable aj,t denotes the total
knowledge stock gained through research, bt denotes the non-rival knowledge stock gained
through learning by doing publicly available to all firms, kj,t is the capital stock, and lj,t, is labor
use in efficient labor units. Human capital increasing labor productivity is not specified explicitly,
as it is considered embodied in the labor good, exogenous to the individual firm.
For fossil fuels, the effort (zt)
µ increases because of decreasing quality of oil wells when the
reserves decrease as a function of cumulative production. The increased effort is measured by the
increase in the variable zt,
zt+1 = zt + yt,( 2 )
where we omitted the subscript j for the output variable yt (=Σjyj,t). In the continuation of this
paper, we also omit time subscripts when convenient. Equation (1) states that the effort required
for energy production, (zt)
µ, increases by 2
µ for every doubling of the cumulative resource
exploitation level. We assume that the energy sources are owned by the firms that exploit these,
hence there is no open access, but there are well-defined property rights. This also implies that the
impact on future efforts of current energy production is internalized, as resource depletion
influences the energy price in our model. For carbon-free energy sources, there is no exhaustion
and we assume µ=0, so that the variable zt can be interpreted as a measure of cumulative
production or experience.
The knowledge variable aj,t is a measure of the number of innovations that are employed by
the j-th firm, at date t. Let h∈[0,1] denote the innovators, and a
inn
j,h the (continuous) number of
innovations in use by firm j owned by innovator h. Furthermore, let a
pub denote the innovations in
public domain, for which no patents have been granted, or for which the patents are expired so
that their use is free from license payments. We assume that innovations are perfect substitutes so
that the total stock of knowledge through R&D is given by
h a a
inn
h j j d
1
0
, ∫ =  + a
pub.( 3 )
Also, we assume that the firms have to pay a license fee θh,t for the innovations employed, for
every innovation that is not in the public domain a
inn
j,h,t, for every unit of output yj,t, so that for the7
firm j, expenditures on innovations amount to 
1
,, ,, 0 d
inn
ht jht jt ay h θ ∫ . Due to the assumed perfect
substitutability between innovations (3), innovators face perfect competition and cannot earn
monopoly rents, and the license fee θtyj,t clears the market of innovations. The license fee is the
same for all innovators, we drop the subscript h, and use the aggregate stock of innovations held





We return to the production of innovations at the end of this section.
The learning-by-doing knowledge stock bt is based on cumulative experience, that is, the
cumulative output level, with some depreciation δb,
bt+1 = (1–δb)bt + yt,( 5 )
where we omitted the subscript j for the output variable yt, as in equation (2). Knowledge through
a and b increases productivity, while the resource externality z decreases productivity, and when
the former two effects exceed the latter, µ<ηa+ηb, productivity increases over time, whereas in
the other case, µ>ηa+ηb, productivity decreases over time.
In addition to the license fees, firms pay for investment expenditures, ij,t, and wages, wtlj,t.
At time t, total expenditures thus amount to ij,t + wtlj,t + θta
inn
j,tyj,t, while revenues amount to
qtyj,t. The firms maximize the net present value of their cash flows:
max 
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β− θ −− ∑ ,( 6 )
where (1/β)–1 is the real interest rate, subject to the production identity (1), the dynamics of
resource depletion (2), and to the capital depreciation-investments relation,
kj,t+1 = (1–δk)kj,t + ij,t.( 7 )
where  δk is the depreciation rate, and it is the investment flow. Fore each individual firm,
expenditures on licenses are proportional to output and production has constant returns to scale
with respect to the production factors capital and labor. The firms thus operate in a competitive
market pricing the output at marginal cost. This holds for all firms and we can (as for h) omit
firms’ subscripts j. Appendix 1 presents the full set of first order conditions.
Next we turn to the supply of innovations. There are two externalities working in opposite
direction. As a positive externality, knowledge about past innovations is public, that is, knowledge
is non-rival when it is used to produce new knowledge. Research innovators use the ‘library’ of
past inventions to produce new innovations, and an increase in the knowledge stock a also8
increases the flow of new innovations. As a negative externality, research efforts r by one
innovator negatively affects the finding of new innovations by other innovators, because a limited
number of new innovations are attainable from the current state of knowledge. The flow of new
innovations for an individual innovator h is thus decreasing in the aggregate research flow r, the
so-called fishing-out effect (Caballero and Jaffe 1993; Kortum 1993). Finally, the number of new
innovations produced by an innovator h, ∆ah, is proportional to its research expenditures rh, and a




h = ζ r
π–1 a
1–π rh – δinna
inn
h.( 8 )
where ζ is a scaling constant and π measures the rate of fishing out. On an aggregate level, π
measures the elasticity of the aggregate flow of new innovations ∆a
inn  with respect to the
aggregate research expenditures r. An increase in the research expenditures leads to a less-then-









Public knowledge is fed through two channels. First, part of the property rights for innovations
held privately by the innovators expires, δinna
inn, and these innovations enter the public domain.
Second, public knowledge is also produced as a direct spinn-of of research, χζ rt
π at
1–π, where
the parameter χ>0 describes the leakage of research activities to public knowledge:
a
pub
t+1 =  (1–δpub)a
pub
t + δinn a
inn
t + χζ rt
π at
1–π. (10)
Also, a small fraction δpub of knowledge becomes obsolete. Appendix 1 presents the full set of
first-order conditions characterizing the R&D market and supply of innovations.
3.  Climate change and energy aggregation
In this section, first we extend the model with emissions and a simple representation of the carbon
cycle, and then we specify competition between fossil-fuel technologies and carbon-free
technologies.
Carbon emissions, expressed as a function of time by Et, are proportional to the use of fossil-
fuel-based energy, yf,t, through the carbon intensity factor εt:
Et = εt yt , (11)9
where εt is assumed to be time-dependent to account for a gradual de-carbonization process; it
declines by 0.2% per year until it reaches 80% of the intensity at 2000, εt=max(0.8, 0.998
t)ε1.
Fossil-fuel consumption has been subject to such a process since the early times of
industrialization, by a transition –in chronological order– from the use of wood to coal, from coal
to oil, and most recently from coal and oil to natural gas (Nakicenovic et al., 1998, Fig 4.16).
Carbon emissions are linked to the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, which in turn
determines the global average surface temperature. The carbon cycle dynamics assumed here are
simple, and follow the approximations supposed in DICE (Nordhaus, 1994). Carbon emissions are
linked to the atmospheric carbon-dioxide concentration, Atmt, which in turn determines the global
average surface temperature, Tempt, using a “1-box representation”:
Atmt+1 = Atm0 + (1–δM)(Atmt – Atm0)+ (1– δE)(Et+Ē), (12)











where δM is the atmospheric CO2 depreciation rate, 1–δE the retention rate of emissions, Ē are
emissions linked to deforestation, agricultural production, and other non-energy greenhouse gas
sources, δT the temperature adjustment rate resulting from the atmospheric warmth capacity, and
T is the long-term equilibrium temperature change associated with a doubling of the atmospheric
CO2 concentration.
In various scenarios, energy is taxed at a fee τ at the basis of its carbon content, and thus, the
tax is expressed in $/tC and it adds a constant markup value to the production costs,
3
pt = qt+τtεt, (14)
where qt is the production cost and εt the energy efficiency as defined in equation (11).
Fossil fuels compete with a generic carbon-free energy source. Energy produced by both
technologies has its own characteristics but they are substitutes. For convenience, we assume
inelastic demand on the aggregate level, ŷt, which growth-rate is set equal to the population
growth rate plus an assumed 1.5 per cent growth per year, gypc,
ŷt+1 = (Popt+1/Popt)(1+gypc)ŷt (15)
Population (Popt) is assumed to grow logistically:
                                                  
3 Alternatively, taxes can be specified as a constant markup ratio: pt=(1+τt)qt.10









where gPop is the population growth rate for low population levels and PopLT is the population
level in the long term to which Popt converges.
The two energy technologies are denoted by g=1,2. We do not assume that energy produced
by both technologies has constant elasticity of substitution, but we assume a linearly
homogeneous and variable elasticity of substitution (VES) aggregation function. Energy system
models (e.g. Peck and Teisberg 1992) typically assume that carbon-free technologies are perfect
substitutes for fossil fuel technologies but have limited maximum supply and relatively high
production costs that slowly decrease over time. Such a set of assumptions does not facilitate an
explanatory description of a continuous diffusion over time of carbon-free technologies, since
under perfect substitution demand is zero for all but the cheapest technology, unless positive
demand is explicitly included as a volume constraint. More generally, perfect substitution between
different technologies cannot explain that relatively expensive new technologies can develop
before they become fully competitive with mature technologies. In contrast, models with a neo-
classical point of reference typically assume complementarity between energy technologies. In
Stephan et al (1997) and Goulder and Schneider (1999), carbon-free technologies and fossil fuel
based technologies are relatively poor substitutes, that is, they have substitution elasticity of unity,
or less
4. Under this assumption, carbon-free technologies will not reach a substantial market share,
irrespective of future decreases in production costs.
In this paper, we specify an aggregator function that bridges the two views on substitutability.
We use the variable σ to denote the elasticity of substitution between the technologies. We assume
that σ is constant along an expansion path, that is when both y1 and y2 increase by the same factor,
but σ varies along an isoquant for constant ŷt. Specifically, the two technologies are considered
moderate substitutes, σ≈1, when one technology is dominant and demand for the other technology
is best described through niche markets. The two technologies are considered good substitutes,
σ>1, when both technologies have substantial market share. Finally, as in the energy system
literature, we assume that no energy source has an absolute comparative advantage in use, that is,
we treat demand for both technologies symmetrically. We can thus write the elasticity of
substitution as a function of the relative inputs of both technologies, σ(y1/y2). In the literature,
various VES-aggregation functions have been specified, see Nadiri (1982, Section 3.1.2) for an
                                                  
4 Note that the elasticity of substitution measures the inverse of the curvature of the production isoquant. It
divides the percentage change in the factor ratio (that is the change in the angle of the input vector) by the
percentage change in the prices (the change in the slope of the isoquant). See, for example, Varian, 1992.11
overview.
5 Our aggregation function is based on the symmetric VES aggregator function
proposed in Kadiyala (1972).
 6 We have specified a linearly homogeneous aggregator function,
() 12 σ/(σ 1) (σ 1)/σ (σ 1)/σ
1, 2, 1, 2, ˆ () tt t t t yy y y y
ϑϑ ϑ −− −− += , (17)
such that it satisfies the following features. The elasticity of substitution is unity if one technology
is dominant, σ→1 for y1/y2→0, or y1/y2→∞. Thus, when one technology is in its infancy with
high production costs, its elasticity of demand is about minus unity, and it has an almost constant
value share. This lower bound on the value share for infant technologies is denoted by the
parameter  ϑ. Also, the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity, signifying more intense
competition, when both technologies are comparable in size. Appendix 1 presents the condition
when prices are equalized to marginal productivity. Figure 2 shows the elasticity of substitution,
σ, for the aggregator function (17), as a function of the share of both energy sources.
4.  Calibration and methodology
We used the model outlined above to carry out a numerical simulation based on approximate real-
world data. As a benchmark scenario, we constructed a business-as-usual path that follows
common assumptions on future energy consumption and prices. The model runs for 45 time steps
of 5 years each, representing the period 2000-2250, though the presentation of data and figures
will be restricted to the first two centuries 2000-2200. On the basis of the database developed for
the IIASA-WEC study (Nakicenovic et al., 1998), final commercial energy consumption in 2000
is estimated to be 320 EJ.
7 From the same database, the share of fossil fuel technologies in energy
production (in 2000) is estimated at 96 %. This corresponds to 307 EJ. The remaining share of 13
EJ is carbon-free energy. Future energy consumption is assumed to increase by 1 per cent per
capita (=gypc). In 2000, the population (Popt) is estimated to be 5.89 billion (Pop1) and its growth
rate 1.45% (World Bank, 1999). The population is assumed to converge to the level of 11.4 billion
people (PopLT), as in the IIASA-WEC study (Nakicenovic et al, 1998).
Since our model represents the two energy resources in an aggregate way, we have to make
reasonable estimates for the average initial energy prices. Because of the variability and volatility
                                                  
5 The authors are grateful to Marzio Galeotti for his help on this topic.
6 Most other VES functions assume that the elasticity of substitution is monotonically increasing in the share of
one of the production factors, while we treat both technologies symmetrically, that is, we assume
σ(y1/y2)=σ(y2/y1).
7 This figure is expressed in primary energy source equivalents, and excludes non-commercial biomass use, as
well as traditional carbon-free sources such as nuclear and hydropower.12
of these prices, this is not straightforward. Prices for final energy derived from natural gas
technologies vary in a range from 2 to 3 $(1990)/GJ.
8 Since coal, oil and natural gas are, grosso
modo, competitive, a good reference price in our calculations for the average fossil fuel energy
resource is 2.5 $/GJ, in the model-start-off year 2000.
A large spread exists in production costs for energy from wind, solar and biomass options.
Prices for commercial final electricity from wind turbines varied in 1995 between 5 and 20
$(1990)/GJ, in the highest-cost and lowest-cost production cases, respectively.
9 Whereas
electricity production costs for photovoltaics are still significantly higher than that for wind
energy, costs of electricity derived from biomass are comparable to that of wind energy.
10 The
average price of final energy by the carbon-free energy is taken to be 7.0 $/GJ, in the year 2000.
This value is merely taken as an example from the range of current feasible wind electricity
prices; it represents a realistic figure of the current cost of a particular carbon-free energy
alternative, generically speaking.
We furthermore assume that both the fossil fuel and carbon-free energy have the same
technology parameters, except for the productivity parameter ς and the resource exhaustion
parameter µ, which is set to zero for the carbon-free technology. Parameters have been calculated
such that in equilibrium research expenditures amount to about 2 per cent of the value of energy
output, prices for fossil fuels remain constant during the first decades and slowly increase
thereafter, and social returns on research exceed the private returns by factor 4. The substitution
elasticity between the two energy sources (Figure 2) and other parameters have been chosen such
that, in the benchmark (BAU) scenario, the share for the carbon-free energy takes an S-shaped
curve and increases from 4% in 2000 to 22% in 2100 and 93% in 2200 (Figure 5). Related to the
carbon-free energy gain in market share, the carbon-free energy benefits from economies of scale
more than the fossil fuel energy source and its price decreases over time, while the price for the
fossil fuel energy technology slightly increases (Figure 6). See Table 2, Appendix 2, for a detailed
list of parameter values.
Since we assume that only for the fossil-fuel energy source, energy production requires an
ever-increasing effort due to exhaustion of the fossil-fuel wells, the equilibrium will converge to a
carbon-free energy dominated situation. Figure 3 presents the cumulative production paths for the
fossil-fuel and carbon-free energy sources. It shows that in the benchmark scenario (Business as
                                                  
8 See, for example, IEA/OECD 1999, p.41.
9 See, for example, IEA/OECD 2000, p.54. In fig.3.3 in this publication, one sees that in 1995 (in the EU) wind
energy production costs varied from about 0.02 to 0.08 ECU(1990)/kWh. Assuming an approximate equivalence
between the ECU and $, as well as the conversion factor of 3.6 in going from GWh to TJ (that is, 0.0036 from
kWh to GJ), one obtains the range quoted here.
10 See, for example, IEA/OECD, 2000, p.21.13
Usual, abbreviated to BAU), in 2100, fossil-fuel production has accumulated to about 100 ZJ, five
times the cumulative output level at 2000. In the 22
nd century, cumulative fossil-fuel production
doubles again. At the end of the 22
nd century, cumulative fossil-fuel energy production levels off.
We notice that, in our model, the end of the fossil-fuel era is not implied by physical upper bound
on the fossil-fuel reserves, but the reserves that can be exploited profitably adjust endogenously












































































BAU fossil BAU carbon-free
FIGURE 2. Elasticity of substitution between
fossil fuel and carbon-free energy sources,
using simulation parameter values σ=5,
ϑ=0.037.
FIGURE 3. Development of cumulative energy
production over time, for fossil fuel and
carbon-free energy in BAU.
5.  Simulation of BAU and carbon-tax policies
This section presents and discusses the results with the calibrated model. We have simulated three
scenarios. The first BAU scenario assumes the absence of carbon taxes. The second scenario,
labeled TAX25_NOITC, assumes a constant carbon tax of 25 $/tC, but it abstracts from
technological change induced by the carbon tax. The third scenario is based on the same
permanent 25 $/tC tax and includes the full model with endogenous technological change.
Comparison of the second and third scenario can show us the importance of induced technological
change relative to factor substitution.
Figure 4 shows the level of emissions in the period 2000–2200 for the first three scenarios,
BAU, a steady 25 $/tC tax without ITC and with ITC. Figure 5 shows how the share of carbon-






















2000 2050 2100 2150 2200
BAU TAX25_NOITC TAX25
FIGURE 4. Emissions for benchmark BAU
scenario, a 25 $/tC tax without technological
adjustment, and a 25 $/tC tax with endogenous
technological change
FIGURE 5. Share for carbon-free energy for
benchmark BAU scenario, a 25 $/tC tax
without technological adjustment, and a 25
$/tC tax with endogenous technological change
We can derive the following conclusions from Figure 4 and Figure 5. Our model appears to
produce a reasonably common BAU scenario as a benchmark. After 2100, the energy system
makes an endogenous transition towards the carbon-free energy technology, and emissions drop.
This is an optimistic perspective, when compared to benchmark scenarios developed in many
other papers, but it is not incredible (Chakravorty et al. 1997).
When we abstract from the impact of carbon taxes on technology,
11 a carbon tax of 25 $/tC
advances the shift towards the carbon-free energy modestly by about 10 years, and thus reduces
emissions modestly. This finding is not surprising, as it is in line with most other studies. In
contrast, when we allow the technology variables ag,t and bg,t to endogenously adjust to the carbon
tax scenarios, so that there is ITC in our calculations, the effect of a carbon tax is amplified by a
magnitude. The transition towards the carbon-free energy source is advanced by about 70 years; it
takes off at around 2020, and emissions drop substantially during the second half of the 21
st
century.
Table 1 presents the reduction in cumulative carbon dioxide emissions over the period 2000-
2100 following the steady carbon tax of 25 $/tC. We compare the reduction in cumulative
emissions without ITC (110 GtC), and with ITC (560 GtC). This leads to an ITC impact factor of
5.0 (=560/110), which is substantially above the factor 2 found by Carraro and Galeotti (1997).
They, however, only included learning by research and left out learning by doing. By this number,
our model clearly indicates the significance of ITC for the responsiveness of cumulative
emissions to constant carbon dioxide taxes, and it seems too pessimistic to assume technology as
                                                  
11 That is, we fix the paths for the variables a and b on their BAU paths, and omit the equations that otherwise
determine their dynamics.15
given in the long run. The results confirm the hypothesis stated in the introduction that ITC might
be more prominent in a model with competing energy sources, as compared to a model that
focuses on energy savings as the major option for emission reductions.
TABLE 1. Cumulative emissions and reduction (2000-2100).
Cumulative emissions Reduction* ITC factor
(GtC) (GtC) (%)
BAU 1300
TAX25_NOITC 1180 110 (9%)
TAX25 730 560 (44%) 5.0
* Reduction levels reported may not precisely match with numbers in the first column entry due to rounding off
errors.



































TAX25 Fossil Fuels TAX25 Carbon-free
FIGURE 6. Energy production costs for fossil
fuels and carbon-free energy benchmark, BAU
scenario.
FIGURE 7. Energy production costs for fossil
fuels and carbon-free energy, 25 $/tC tax
scenario with ITC.
Figure 6 plots the energy production costs for fossil fuels and carbon-free energy, while Figure 7
shows these costs for the case with a steady 25 $/tC tax and ITC.
12 We draw the following
conclusions from the figures. Under BAU (Figure 6), production costs for carbon-free energy
steadily decrease, until, by 2130, they equal production costs of fossil fuels. From that point on,
the loss of market shares faced by fossil fuels accelerates; output levels for fossil fuels decreases,
                                                  
12 While it is not presented in the figures, the energy production costs under the TAX25_NOITC scenario match
the BAU levels.16
the R&D effort and learning by doing decreases and the growth of innovations slows down.
Technological development becomes insufficient to compensate for resource exhaustion and the
increase in wages and fossil fuel prices increase. In the 25 $/tC tax scenario (Figure 7), the same
mechanism causes the production costs for fossil fuels to increase after 2070, when carbon-free
energy sources take over as the dominant energy source. At the same time, the carbon tax
increases the market share for carbon-free energy and stimulates innovation and learning by
doing, and this leads to an earlier decrease in production costs for the carbon-free energy source.
Thus, ITC acts as a multiplier for a policy that aims at a transformation from carbon-based to
carbon-free energy sources.
In the energy system literature, the phenomenon of decreasing production costs when
experience increases for new technologies is typically described through a learning curve. In
models that describe learning by doing through learning curves (e.g. MESSAGE, Messner 1997;
DEMETER-1, van der Zwaan et al. 2002, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan 2003), typically a constant
learning rate (lr) is assumed of approximately 20% for new technologies, at which the cost of
investments or the costs of production per output unit declines for each doubling of cumulative
production. This corresponds to
 qt = q1 (zt/z1)
α–1, (18)
where zt is the cumulative experience at period t, and 0<α<1 defines the learning rate as
lr = 1 – 2
α–1. (19)
While in our model, there is no exogenous learning rate, we can reproduce ex post the learning
curves and the learning rate that comes out of our simulations.
Thereupon, we plot the logarithm of production cost per unit of output against the logarithm
of cumulative output for fossil fuels and carbon-free in Figure 8 and Figure 9, respectively. For
the carbon-free energy sources, under BAU, over the period 2000-2200, we find an average
learning rate of about 20% (Figure 9). Thus, our model reasonably captures the main insight from





















































FIGURE 8. Simulated learning curve for fossil
fuels, BAU scenario and 25 $/tC tax scenario
with ITC.
FIGURE 9. Simulated learning curve for carbon-
free energy, BAU scenario and 25 $/tC tax
scenario with ITC.
In the steady 25 $/tC tax case, initially the learning curve becomes steeper. Obviously, in our
model, the learning curve is not assumed ex ante, but it merely gives a reduced presentation of the
complex interplay between increasing wages, extraction efforts, innovations, and learning by
doing. In our model, the mechanisms underlying the curve differ from the energy system models
in an important way. First, for both energy sources, technology advances through two channels,
R&D and learning by doing, but at the same time, technological growth has to offset increasing
wages for both energy sources, and increasing resource scarcity for the fossil fuels as well. Thus,
production costs only decrease when technological advances are sufficient to offset the two forces
that tend to increase prices. For fossil fuels, as has become clear from Figure 6 and Figure 8, in
the early decades of the 21
st century, technological progress is just sufficient to compensate
increasing wages and increasing scarcity. After the break-through of carbon-free energy sources,
prices increase, even though the stock of technology keeps growing.
Second, in our model, while technological progress through learning by doing is based on
past cumulative experience, technological progress through R&D is based on expected revenues
from innovations. Thus, an anticipated increase in the market share for carbon-free energy sources
increases current R&D effort and decreases production costs, in advance of the rise in carbon-free
energy. This explains why in Figure 9 the learning curve for the 25 $/tC scenario lies below the
learning curve for the BAU scenario.
Applying the climate change equations (12) and (13), the atmospheric carbon concentration
















































FIGURE 10. Atmospheric carbon concentration
for benchmark BAU scenario, a 25 $/tC tax
without technological adjustment, and a 25
$/tC tax with endogenous technological
change.
FIGURE 11. Temperature for benchmark BAU
scenario, a 25 $/tC tax without technological
adjustment, and a 25 $/tC tax with endogenous
technological change.
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the impact of a carbon tax of 25$/tC and ITC on the atmospheric
carbon concentration and the global temperature. In the third scenario, the atmospheric carbon
concentration stabilizes and reaches its peak of about 500 ppmv in the year 2100. Figure 11 shows
that induced technical change is essential for the carbon tax to keep the global warming impact
below the mark of 2.5
oC.
6.  Discussion
In this paper we presented an economic model that successfully reproduced some of the results
known from the energy-system models, notably (i) the learning curve, and (ii) the S-curved
transition towards new (carbon-free) technologies.
As for (i), this paper may contribute to bridge the gap between the neo-classical economic
literature that focuses on incentives for R&D as the driving force for productivity growth, and the
energy systems models that more or less mechanically describe productivity as dependent on
cumulative historic experience. Also, in our model, in contrast to energy system models,
production costs tend to increase because of increasing wages. Production costs can only decrease
insofar as the increase in productivity exceeds the increase in wages. When, in the long term,
fossil fuels are slowly replaced by carbon-free energy sources, research levels will fall for fossil
fuels, and production costs will increase due to increasing wages and resource exhaustion. Fossil
fuels will follow an inverted learning curve when fading out.
As for (ii), from energy system analysis, it is known that the process from invention, to
demonstration projects, to significant market shares typically takes between five and seven19
decades (Nakicenovic et al. 1998). Energy system models incorporate these insights by explicitly
setting constraints on the increase in market shares for new technologies. Our model does not
have such market penetration constraints, but it still generates the same S-curve for the market
share of carbon-free energy sources. Also, when climate change policy stimulates the transition
towards non carbon emitting energy sources, the transition is enhanced, but it becomes not
unrealistically high. Our model describes how economic incentives enhance the penetration rate
of new technologies, for a further discussion on these issues, see Caldeira et al. (2003), O’Neill et
al. (2003), Swart et al. (2003), Hoffert et al. (2003).
Besides the methodological insights, we have used the model to carry out some policy
analyses, to verify whether induced technological change has a large impact on the responsiveness
of emissions to carbon taxes. As a measure of this response, we have taken the reduction in
cumulative carbon dioxide emissions over the period 2000-2100 following a constant carbon tax
of 25 $/tC. Induced technological change enhances cumulative emissions reductions by factor 5.
This is in strong contrast with previous studies, which found that either the impact of ITC is as
important as factor substitution (Carraro and Galeotti 1997; van der Zwaan et al 2002; Gerlagh
and van der Zwaan 2003) or less important (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Nordhaus, 2001). We
may conclude that taking induced technological change into consideration, a more optimistic
perspective arises on the possibilities of emission reductions than without it. We should add
immediately, however, that the model employed in this paper focused on the energy transition
from fossil fuels to carbon-free energy sources, while neglecting energy savings as an option to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. For energy savings, factor substitution might prove more
important, relative to induced technological change. When one would carry out an overall
assessment of ITC in both energy savings and an energy transition, one may expect an ITC factor
in-between the (relative low) values found in the earlier studies and the (relative high) value found
in the exercise presented in this paper.20
Appendix 1. First order conditions for firms’ profit maximization
The energy producers
In this appendix, we derive all first order conditions for the representative energy producer.
The Lagrangean for profit maximization (6) subject to (1), (2), and (7) reads:








– ψk + βψ+1(i+(1–δk)k) + κz – βκ+1(z + y)) (20)
Where β
tλt>0 is the dual variable for (1), β
t+1ψt+1>0 is the dual variable for (7), and β
t+1κt+1>0 is
the reversed dual variable for (2). For convenience, we omitted time subscripts for the variables in
the Lagrangean, and used shorthand notation ψ+1 to denote the forward time lap ψt+1. The first
order conditions for y, a, l, i, k, and z are, respectively,
q = θa
inn + λ + βκ+1, (21)
θy = ηaλy/a, (22)
w = (1–α)λ y/l ,  (23)
1 = β ψ+1 ,  (24)
ψ = β(1–δ)ψ+1 + αλy/k, (25)
κ = βκ+1 + µλy/z. (26)
We can substitute equations (24) in (25) to derive a capital cost equation that shows capital costs
to consist of interest and depreciation:
δk + 1/β – 1  = αλy/k . (27)
The price of the output good, q, consists of three parts (21), the license fee θa
inn, the immediate
production costs λ, and the resource scarcity rent βκt+1. From (21) and (22), we see that innovation
costs make a constant mark up ηa on top of the immediate production costs net of the license fee,
λ,
θa = ηaλ . (28)
which enables us to give the price of innovations θ as:




Substitution of (28) in (21) gives us output prices q as
q = (1+ηa a
inn/a)λ + βκ+1. (30)21
where λt is the marginal production costs per unit of output,









with ξ the price of the factor composite (kj)
α(lj)








which is exogenous to the firm. The term βκ+1 describes the resource rent for the future increase in
resource exploitation efforts due to present exploitation levels. Equations (30) and (31) display
that output prices are proportional to factor costs, as expressed in ξ, inversely proportional to the
technological productivity, a
ηa and b
ηb, that there is a mark up ηaa
inn/a for the costs of technology
and for the resource rent.
For the carbon-free energy resource sector, we assume that there is no exhaustion and we




t  denote the asset price of an innovation, that is, the value of an increased innovation level
∆ah  to its owner. An equilibrium on the market for innovations requires that the costs of
developing a new technology, that is, the costs of an increase ∆ah, equals the revenues the
innovator can obtain by selling the license fees. That is, the asset price of an innovation, one
period ahead, βφ
inn
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In terms of a recursive equation, we write
φ
inn   = θy + (1–δinn)βφ
inn
+1. (36)22
Private and social returns on research do not match. The social returns of an innovation held by
the innovator are given by
φ





where the first two terms on the right-hand-side are the same as for the private returns, but the
third term reflects the fact that those innovations that leak from the private sector to the public
domain also contribute to the social value of the privately held innovations. In turn, the social
value of knowledge in the public domain, in terms of a recursive equation, is given by
φ
pub  = θy + (1–δpub)βφ
pub
+1. (38)
Given these three values for innovations, we can calculate the social return on research in period t
(SRRt). For the individual firm, the private value of an innovation is equal to the production costs
per unit of innovation, βφ
inn
+1=rh/∆ah, as described in (33). Public returns, however, fall short
of private returns because of the fishing out of innovations. The factor is given by the ratio
between marginal productivity of research, da
inn/dr, as described by (9), and the private
productivity of research, (∆a
inn




h) = π. (39)
At the same time, public returns exceed private returns because of the spill-over from privately
held knowledge to publicly available knowledge. First, the social value of privately held




t+1>1, and second, research leads to a direct spin












When the SRR exceeds unity, SRR>1, the social returns on research exceed the costs, and policies
are warranted that stimulate research above its equilibrium level. Typically, from empirical
studies, the SRR is found to be in the order of four, SRR≈4.
Energy aggregation




σ 1/ σσ 1/ σσ 1/ σσ 1/ σ
22 1 11 2 11 1 222 1 ypy ypy ypy ypy ϑϑ
−− − − −− = − , (41)23
Total model
The dynamic two-technology model consists of equations (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (9), (10), (14),
(21), (23), (24), (26), (27), (28), (32), (34), (36), (37), (38), (40), both for fossil fuels and carbon-
free energy; equations (17) and (41) are used for aggregation. The impact of energy production on
the global carbon cycle is calculated ex post via equations: (11), (12) and (13).
Appendix 2. Model parameters and variable values in calibration procedure
TABLE 2. Calibration parameters and variable values in first period (2000-2004) for fossil fuels
Parameters Fossil fuels Carbon-free Endogenous variables Fossil fuels Carbon-free
α 0.300 y [ZJ] 1.536* 0.064*
β 0.784 p [$/GJ] 2.500* 7.000*





δpub 0.350 b  3.423 0.125
χ 6.441* z 15.566 0.394
µ 0.164* 0.000 q 2.500 7.000
ηa 0.250* λ 2.295 6.792
ηb 0.100 l 2.468 0.304
π 0.500 i 0.758 0.100
ζ 0.565* k 1.689 0.208
ς  0.572* 0.295* ξ 2.798 5.435
σ 5.000 r [trillion $] 0.0768* 0.010








ŷ  1.491* θ 0.070 1.803
SRR 4.000* 4.000
Exogenous variables growth rates Variables growth rates
gŷ 0.0987* gp 0* -0.0278
gw 0.0252 gϕ 00
gy   0.0987* 0.1623
ga 0.0987 0.1301
gl 0.0199 0.1022
* For fossil fuels, empirical data for y and p, a normalization for a=1, research expenditures that
make 2 per cent of total value of output, and a social rate of return on research of SRR=4, and
growth rates gp=0, gy=0.0987 are used to calibrate the parameters χ, ηa, ς, ζ, µ, and the
variable ŷ. For carbon-free energy, empirical data for y and p are used to calibrate the
parameters ς and ϑ. Other parameters are based on literature and guesses.24
TABLE 3. Population and climate change parameters
Parameters and variables (unit of measurement) value in model per year
ε1 (gC/MJ) 0.0205
Atm0 (ppmv) 590
δM (.) 0.0408 0.0083
δE (.) 0.36
Ē (GtC/yr) 6.65 1.33
δT (.) 0.096 0.02
T (K) 3.0
gypc (.) 0.051 0.01
gPop (.) 0.149 0.0282
Pop1 (billion people) 5.89
PopLT (billion people) 11.36
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